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Warning of War in Europe : Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces

By Central Intelegence Agent

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Book Id: WPLBN0000704879
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 244.35 KB.
Reproduction Date: 2006
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Title: Warning of War in Europe : Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces  
Author: Central Intelegence Agent
Language: English
Subject: Government publications, CIA research reports, National security.
Collections: CIA Documents Collection
Publication Date:
Publisher: Central Intelegence Agent


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Agent, C. I. (n.d.). Warning of War in Europe : Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces. Retrieved from

Excerpt: Key Judgments; The warning times we associate with possible Warsaw Pact preparations for war with NATO in Central Europe have increased significantly from those set forth in NIE 4-1-84. These changes are a direct consequence of Soviet assessments of improved NATO military capability, our improved understanding of the Soviet process of transitioning to war, and changes in Soviet peacetime readiness. Accordingly, before unilateral force reductions, we assess that: Pact military planners would prefer and are most likely to attempt to conduct a well-prepared attack involving five to six fronts with four fronts in the first strategic echelon. We should be able to provide about four to five weeks of warning of such an attack. The increased time needed to prepare this attack option results from increased reliance in the first echelon on not ready divisions from the western USSR. An attack with three fronts in the first echelon remains a possibility in some circumstances, We should be able to provide about two to three weeks of warning of such an attack. Our assessment of the increased time needed to prepare these fronts for sustained offensive operations results from new judgments about the time required to prepare Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe. We recognize that circumstances could cause the Pact to commit its forces to an attack after the completion of mobilization and movement but before completing postmobilization training necessary for minimum proficiency for offensive operations. If so, we could provide at least two weeks of warning of a four-front attack or at least one week warning of a less likely three-front attack. We believe, however, the Soviets would judge attacks before completion of post mobilization training as highly risky because of the reliance on reserves lacking such training.


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